From owner-doc-jp-work@jp.FreeBSD.org Sat Aug  3 05:04:20 2002
Received: (from daemon@localhost)
	by castle.jp.FreeBSD.org (8.11.6+3.4W/8.11.3) id g72K4KN94601;
	Sat, 3 Aug 2002 05:04:20 +0900 (JST)
	(envelope-from owner-doc-jp-work@jp.FreeBSD.org)
Received: from wasley.bl.mmtr.or.jp (wasley.bl.mmtr.or.jp [210.228.160.21])
	by castle.jp.FreeBSD.org (8.11.6+3.4W/8.11.3) with SMTP/inet id g72K4Kn94596
	for <doc-jp-work@jp.FreeBSD.org>; Sat, 3 Aug 2002 05:04:20 +0900 (JST)
	(envelope-from rushani@bl.mmtr.or.jp)
Received: (qmail 27186 invoked from network); 3 Aug 2002 05:04:15 +0900
Received: from unknown (HELO localhost) (210.165.137.253)
  by mx.bl.mmtr.or.jp with SMTP; 3 Aug 2002 05:04:15 +0900
Date: Sat, 03 Aug 2002 05:02:55 +0900 (JST)
Message-Id: <20020803.050255.112305643.rushani@bl.mmtr.or.jp>
To: doc-jp-work@jp.FreeBSD.org
From: Hideyuki KURASHINA <rushani@bl.mmtr.or.jp>
X-PGP-Public-Key: http://www.bl.mmtr.or.jp/~rushani/public_key.txt
X-PGP-Fingerprint: A052 6F98 6146 6FE3 91E2  DA6B F2FA 2088 439A DC57
X-URL: http://www.bl.mmtr.or.jp/~rushani/
X-Mailer: Mew version 3.0.54 on Emacs 21.2 / Mule 5.0 (SAKAKI)
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: Multipart/Mixed;
 boundary="--Next_Part(Sat_Aug__3_05:02:55_2002_061)--"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Reply-To: doc-jp-work@jp.FreeBSD.org
Precedence: list
X-Sequence: doc-jp-work 456
Subject: [doc-jp-work 456] Re: ANNOUNCE: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-02:23.stdio
 [REVISED]
Errors-To: owner-doc-jp-work@jp.FreeBSD.org
Sender: owner-doc-jp-work@jp.FreeBSD.org
X-Originator: rushani@bl.mmtr.or.jp
X-Distribute: distribute version 2.1 (Alpha) patchlevel 24e+020727

----Next_Part(Sat_Aug__3_05:02:55_2002_061)--
Content-Type: Text/Plain; charset=iso-2022-jp
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

$BARIJ$G$9(B.

02:23.stdio [REVISED] $B$G$9(B.

$B86J8$N:9J,$OE:IU$7$?(B 02:23.diff.en $B$NDL$j$G$9(B.

$B$J$*(B, X-Sequence: announce-jp 981 $B$N(B hrs $B$5$s$NK]Lu$r%Y!<%9$K;H$o$;$F(B
$B$$$?$@$-$^$7$?(B.

-- rushani

----Next_Part(Sat_Aug__3_05:02:55_2002_061)--
Content-Type: Text/Plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Disposition: inline; filename="02:23.diff.en"

--- 02:23	Sat Aug  3 04:24:53 2002
+++ 02:23.2	Sat Aug  3 04:24:59 2002
@@ -9,14 +9,22 @@
 Category:       core
 Module:         kernel
 Announced:      2002-04-22
-Credits:        Joost Pol <joost@pine.nl>
-Affects:        All releases of FreeBSD up to and including 4.5-RELEASE
-                4.5-STABLE prior to the correction date
-Corrected:      2002-04-21 13:06:45 UTC (RELENG_4)
-                2002-04-21 13:08:57 UTC (RELENG_4_5)
-                2002-04-21 13:10:51 UTC (RELENG_4_4)
+Credits:        Joost Pol <joost@pine.nl>,
+                Georgi Guninski <guninski@guninski.com>
+Affects:        All releases of FreeBSD up to and including 4.6-RELEASE
+                4.6-STABLE prior to the correction date
+Corrected:      2002-07-30 15:40:46 UTC (RELENG_4)
+                2002-07-30 15:42:11 UTC (RELENG_4_6)
+                2002-07-30 15:42:46 UTC (RELENG_4_5)
+                2002-07-30 15:43:17 UTC (RELENG_4_4)
 FreeBSD only:   NO
 
+0.   Revision History
+
+v1.0  2002-04-22  Initial release
+v1.1  2002-04-23  Patch and revision numbers updated
+v1.2  2002-07-29  procfs issue; updated patch
+
 I.   Background
 
 By convention, POSIX systems associate file descriptors 0, 1, and 2
@@ -46,6 +54,15 @@
 normally not have privileges to open, this may result in an
 opportunity for privilege escalation.
 
+The original correction for this problem (corresponding to the first
+revision of this advisory) contained an error.  Systems using procfs
+or linprocfs could still be exploited.  The dates for the original,
+incomplete correction were:
+
+Corrected:      2002-04-21 13:06:45 UTC (RELENG_4)
+                2002-04-21 13:08:57 UTC (RELENG_4_5)
+                2002-04-21 13:10:51 UTC (RELENG_4_4)
+
 III. Impact
 
 Local users may gain superuser privileges.  It is known that the
@@ -54,25 +71,50 @@
 
 IV.  Workaround
 
+[FreeBSD systems earlier than 4.5-RELEASE-p4 and 4.4-RELEASE-p11]
+
 None.  The set-user-id bit may be removed from `keyinit' using the
 following command, but note that there may be other programs that can
 be exploited.
 
 # chmod 0555 /usr/bin/keyinit
 
+[FreeBSD versions 4.5-RELEASE-p4 or later, 4.4-RELEASE-p11 or later,
+ 4.6-RELEASE, and 4.6-STABLE]
+
+Unmount all instances of the procfs and linprocfs filesystems using
+the umount(8) command:
+
+# umount -f -a -t procfs
+# umount -f -a -t linprocfs
+
 V.   Solution
 
-1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to 4.5-STABLE; or to either of the
-RELENG_4_5 (4.5-RELEASE-p4) or RELENG_4_4 (4.4-RELEASE-p11) security
-branches dated after the respective correction dates.
+The kernel was modified to check file descriptors 0, 1, and 2 when
+starting a set-user-ID or set-group-ID executable.  If any of these
+are not in use, they will be redirected to /dev/null.
+
+1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to 4.6-STABLE; or to any of
+the RELENG_4_6 (4.6.1-RELEASE-p1), RELENG_4_5 (4.5-RELEASE-p10), or
+RELENG_4_4 (4.4-RELEASE-p17) security branches dated after the
+respective correction dates.
 
 2) To patch your present system:
 
 a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
 detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
 
-# fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-02:23/stdio.patch
-# fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-02:23/stdio.patch.asc
+
+[FreeBSD systems earlier than 4.5-RELEASE-p4 and 4.4-RELEASE-p11]
+
+# fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-02:23/stdio.patch.v1.2
+# fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-02:23/stdio.patch.v1.2.asc
+
+[FreeBSD versions 4.5-RELEASE-p4 or later, 4.4-RELEASE-p11 or later,
+ 4.6-RELEASE, and 4.6-STABLE]
+
+# fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-02:23/stdio2.patch.v1.2
+# fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-02:23/stdio2.patch.v1.2.asc
 
 b) Execute the following commands as root:
 
@@ -93,33 +135,36 @@
 - -------------------------------------------------------------------------
 sys/sys/filedesc.h
   RELENG_4                                                       1.19.2.4
+  RELENG_4_6                                                     1.19.2.4
   RELENG_4_5                                                 1.19.2.3.6.1
   RELENG_4_4                                                 1.19.2.3.4.1
 sys/kern/kern_exec.c
-  RELENG_4                                                     1.107.2.14
-  RELENG_4_5                                               1.107.2.13.2.1
-  RELENG_4_4                                                1.107.2.8.2.2
+  RELENG_4                                                     1.107.2.15
+  RELENG_4_6                                               1.107.2.14.2.1
+  RELENG_4_5                                               1.107.2.13.2.2
+  RELENG_4_4                                                1.107.2.8.2.3
 sys/kern/kern_descrip.c
-  RELENG_4                                                      1.81.2.11
-  RELENG_4_5                                                 1.81.2.9.2.1
-  RELENG_4_4                                                 1.81.2.8.2.1
+  RELENG_4                                                      1.81.2.12
+  RELENG_4_6                                                    1.81.2.14
+  RELENG_4_5                                                 1.81.2.9.2.2
+  RELENG_4_4                                                 1.81.2.8.2.2
 sys/conf/newvers.sh
-  RELENG_4_5                                                1.44.2.20.2.5
-  RELENG_4_4                                               1.44.2.17.2.10
+  RELENG_4_6                                                1.44.2.23.2.6
+  RELENG_4_5                                               1.44.2.20.2.11
+  RELENG_4_4                                               1.44.2.17.2.16
 - -------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
 VII. References
 
 PINE-CERT-20020401 <URL:http://www.pine.nl/advisories/pine-cert-20020401.txt>
 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
-Version: GnuPG v1.0.6 (FreeBSD)
-Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org
+Version: GnuPG v1.0.7 (FreeBSD)
 
-iQCVAwUBPMRPoFUuHi5z0oilAQE0/AP/R2qPI5bI2XIFgQ6FL+m4rUZ7M6VQzZqY
-yzGskbEkG2LKTYPFQ/FF+Tx6ffbMicnyrTTvDcJ3F9lmKRNvPBVaOuiNBjkrLdQc
-rerg2aHSJunQCkcd7f/+RjxtWO8wbjTM9TXmc8X1G9kJGaglCwEfHkZJzmsyGDyD
-qjkDToXu9a8=
-=oXDh
+iQCVAwUBPUbXw1UuHi5z0oilAQFgKQP/eOnmHorw/4NVEAEKTQp4+X7Px9p1wUGq
+6OcLH5GuTbbwexd7KbCjbjzNZF7zgz1Qph2v7NQXb+W/ZaW2hEgcoURXkBomVxjl
+61oXu72P35bmgNo7GQ794v/WDHd8FymtBv0kyY/vuZqg6l99tTuwi2ryV1ZszVrh
+w21lAbhkyQo=
+=YGVw
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 This is the moderated mailing list freebsd-announce.

----Next_Part(Sat_Aug__3_05:02:55_2002_061)--
Content-Type: Text/Plain; charset=iso-2022-jp
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Disposition: inline; filename="02:23"


FreeBSD $B%;%-%e%j%F%#4+9p(B $BF|K\8lHG(B
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-02:23.stdio (2002-04-22)
 * insecure handling of stdio file descriptors
=============================================================================

 $B$3$N%a!<%k$O(B, announce-jp $B$KN.$l$?(B

  Subject: ANNOUNCE: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-02:23.stdio [REVISED]
  From: FreeBSD Security Advisories <security-advisories@FreeBSD.org>
  Date: Tue, 30 Jul 2002 11:21:04 -0700 (PDT)
  Message-Id: <200207301821.g6UIL4Mg034029@freefall.freebsd.org>
  X-Sequence: announce-jp 1016

 $B$rF|K\8lLu$7$?$b$N$G$9!#(B

 $B86J8$O(B PGP $B=pL>$5$l$F$$$^$9$,!"$3$NF|K\8lLu$O(B PGP $B=pL>$5$l$F$$$^$;$s!#(B
 $B=$@5%Q%C%AEy$NFbMF$,2~$6$s$5$l$F$$$J$$$3$H$r3NG'$9$k$?$a$K(B PGP $B=pL>$N(B
 $B%A%'%C%/$r9T$J$&$K$O!"86J8$r;2>H$7$F$/$@$5$$!#(B

 $BF|K\8lLu$*$h$S%_%i!<%5%$%HMxMQ$N>\:Y$K$D$$$F$O!"J8Kv$N!V(BA. FreeBSD
 $B%;%-%e%j%F%#4+9p(B $BF|K\8lHG$K$D$$$F!W$r$4Mw$/$@$5$$!#(B


                                 [$BK]Lu<T(B: $BARIJ(B $B1Q9T(B <rushani@jp.FreeBSD.org>]
--($B$3$3$+$i(B)
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-02:23.stdio                                      Security Advisory
                                                          The FreeBSD Project

$B%H%T%C%/(B:       stdio $B%U%!%$%k5-=R;R$K$*$1$k%;%-%e%j%F%#E*$KITE,@Z$J=hM}LdBj(B
                (insecure handling of stdio file descriptors)

$BJ,N`(B:           core
$B%b%8%e!<%k(B:     kernel
$B9pCNF|(B:         2002-04-22
$B%/%l%8%C%H(B:     Joost Pol <joost@pine.nl>,
                Georgi Guninski <guninski@guninski.com>
$B1F6AHO0O(B:       4.6-RELEASE $B$r4^$`!"$3$l$^$G$N$9$Y$F$N(B FreeBSD $B%j%j!<%9(B
                $B=$@5F|$h$jA0$N(B 4.6-STABLE
$B=$@5F|(B:		2002-07-30 15:40:46 UTC (RELENG_4)
                2002-07-30 15:42:11 UTC (RELENG_4_6)
                2002-07-30 15:42:46 UTC (RELENG_4_5)
                2002-07-30 15:43:17 UTC (RELENG_4_4)
FreeBSD $B$K8GM-$+(B:       NO

0.   $B2~D{MzNr(B - Revision History

v1.0  2002-04-22  Initial release
v1.1  2002-04-23  Patch and revision numbers updated
v1.2  2002-07-29  procfs issue; updated patch

I.   $BGX7J(B - Background

By convention, POSIX systems associate file descriptors 0, 1, and 2
with standard input, standard output, and standard error,
respectively.  Almost all applications give these stdio file
descriptors special significance, such as writing error messages to
standard error (file descriptor 2).
POSIX $B%7%9%F%`$G$O8E$/$+$i!"%U%!%$%k5-=R;R(B 0, 1, 2 $B$r$=$l$>$l(B
$BI8=`F~NO!"I8=`=PNO!"I8=`%(%i!<=PNO$K3d$jEv$F$F$$$^$9!#$[$\$9$Y$F$N(B
$B%"%W%j%1!<%7%g%s$O!"$3$l$i$N(B stdio $B%U%!%$%k5-=R;R$r!"$?$H$($P(B
$B%(%i!<%a%C%;!<%8$rI8=`%(%i!<=PNO(B ($B%U%!%$%k5-=R;R(B 2) $B$K=q$-=P$9$J$I!"(B
$BFCJL$J0UL#$r;}$D$b$N$H$7$F07$C$F$$$^$9!#(B

In new processes, all file descriptors are duplicated from the parent
process.  Unless these descriptors are marked close-on-exec, they
retain their state during an exec.
$B?7$7$$%W%m%;%9$K$*$1$k%U%!%$%k5-=R;R$O$9$Y$F!"?F%W%m%;%9$+$i(B
$BJ#@=$5$l$?$b$N$G$9!#$3$l$i$N%U%!%$%k5-=R;R$O!V(Bexec $B;~$K%/%m!<%:$9$k(B
(close-on-exec)$B!W$H%^!<%/$5$l$F$$$J$$8B$j!"(Bexec $BCf$bB8:_$7B3$1$^$9!#(B

All POSIX systems assign file descriptors in sequential order,
starting with the lowest unused file descriptor.  For example, if a
newly exec'd process has file descriptors 0 and 1 open, but file
descriptor 2 closed, and then opens a file, the new file descriptor is
guaranteed to be 2 (standard error).
$B$9$Y$F$N(B POSIX $B%7%9%F%`$G$O%U%!%$%k5-=R;R$r!";HMQ$7$F$$$J$$:G$b>.$5$$?tCM$+$i(B
$B=gHV$K3d$jEv$F$^$9!#$?$H$($P!"?7$7$/(B exec $B$5$l$?%W%m%;%9$K$*$$$F!"(B
$B%U%!%$%k5-=R;R(B 0 $B$H(B 1 $B$,%*!<%W%s$5$l$F$$$F!"%U%!%$%k5-=R;R(B 2 $B$,(B
$B%/%m!<%:$5$l$F$$$k>l9g!"$=$N%W%m%;%9$,%U%!%$%k$r%*!<%W%s$9$k$H!"(B
$B$=$N?7$7$$%U%!%$%k5-=R;R$O(B 2 ($BI8=`%(%i!<=PNO(B) $B$K$J$k$3$H$,J]>Z$5$l$F$$$^$9!#(B

II.  $BLdBj$N>\:Y(B - Problem Description

Some programs are set-user-id or set-group-id, and therefore run with
increased privileges.  If such a program is started with some of the
stdio file descriptors closed, the program may open a file and
inadvertently associate it with standard input, standard output, or
standard error.  The program may then read data from or write data to
the file inappropriately.  If the file is one that the user would
normally not have privileges to open, this may result in an
opportunity for privilege escalation.
set-user-id, set-group-id $B$5$l$F$$$k%W%m%0%i%`$O9b$$8"8B$GF0:n$7$^$9!#(B
$B$=$N$h$&$J%W%m%0%i%`$,(B stdio $B%U%!%$%k5-=R;R$N$$$/$D$+$,%/%m!<%:$5$l$?(B
$B>uBV$G<B9T$5$l$?>l9g!"$=$N%W%m%0%i%`$,%U%!%$%k$r%*!<%W%s$9$k$H!"(B
$B$=$N%U%!%$%k$,I8=`F~NO$dI8=`=PNO!"$"$k$$$OI8=`%(%i!<=PNO$K0U?^$;$:$K(B
$B7k$S$D$$$F$7$^$&2DG=@-$,$"$j$^$9!#$=$&$J$k$H!"$=$N%W%m%0%i%`$OITE,@Z$K(B
$B$=$N%U%!%$%k$+$i%G!<%?$rFI$_9~$s$@$j!"%G!<%?$r%U%!%$%k$K=q$-9~$s$@$j(B
$B$9$k$+$b$7$l$^$;$s!#2>$K$=$N%U%!%$%k$,DL>o0lHL%f!<%6$N8"8B$G$O(B
$B%*!<%W%s$G$-$J$$%U%!%$%k$G$"$C$?$H$9$k$H!"$3$l$O9b$$8"8B$r(B
$BF@$k$?$a$KMxMQ$G$-$k2DG=@-$,$"$j$^$9!#(B

The original correction for this problem (corresponding to the first
revision of this advisory) contained an error.  Systems using procfs
or linprocfs could still be exploited.  The dates for the original,
incomplete correction were:
$B$3$NLdBj$N(B ($B$3$N4+9p$N:G=i$N2~Dj$K$"$?$k(B) $BA0$N=$@5$K$O8m$j$,$"$j$^$7$?!#(B
procfs $B$^$?$O(B linprocfs $B$rMxMQ$7$F$$$k%7%9%F%`$O0JA0$H$7$F@H<e@-$,(B
$B;D$C$F$$$^$9!#@h$NIT40A4$J=$@5$O0J2<$NF|;~$K9T$o$l$^$7$?!#(B

$B=$@5F|(B:		2002-04-21 13:06:45 UTC (RELENG_4)
                2002-04-21 13:08:57 UTC (RELENG_4_5)
                2002-04-21 13:10:51 UTC (RELENG_4_4)

III. $B1F6AHO0O(B - Impact

Local users may gain superuser privileges.  It is known that the
`keyinit' set-user-id program is exploitable using this method.  There
may be other programs that are exploitable.
$B%m!<%+%k%f!<%6$O%9!<%Q%f!<%68"8B$rF@$k$3$H$,$G$-$k2DG=@-$,$"$j$^$9!#(B
`keyinit' $B$H$$$&(B set-user-id $B$5$l$?%W%m%0%i%`$O!"$3$N<jK!$G0-MQ2DG=$J$3$H$,(B
$BH=L@$7$F$$$^$9!#$*$=$i$/!"B>$N%W%m%0%i%`$K$bF1MM$K0-MQ$,2DG=$J$b$N$,(B
$BB8:_$9$k$H;W$o$l$^$9!#(B

IV.  $B2sHrJ}K!(B - Workaround

[FreeBSD 4.5-RELEASE-p4 $B$H(B 4.4-RELEASE-p11 $B$h$jA0$N%7%9%F%`(B]

None.  The set-user-id bit may be removed from `keyinit' using the
following command, but note that there may be other programs that can
be exploited.
$B$"$j$^$;$s!#<!$N%3%^%s%I$r<B9T$9$k$3$H$G(B `keyinit' $B$+$i(B set-user-id $B%S%C%H$r(B
$B<h$j=|$/$3$H$,2DG=$G$9$,!"$*$=$i$/B>$K$b0-MQ2DG=$J%W%m%0%i%`$OB8:_$9$k$G$7$g$&!#(B

# chmod 0555 /usr/bin/keyinit

[FreeBSD versions 4.5-RELEASE-p4 or later, 4.4-RELEASE-p11 or later,
 4.6-RELEASE, and 4.6-STABLE]
[FreeBSD 4.5-RELEASE-p4 $B0J9_!"(B4.4-RELEASE-p11 $B0J9_!"(B4.6-RELEASE$B!"(B
 $B=$@5F|0JA0$N(B 4.6-STABLE $B$N%7%9%F%`(B]

Unmount all instances of the procfs and linprocfs filesystems using
the umount(8) command:
umount(8) $B$rMQ$$$F(B procfs$B!"(Blinprocfs $B%U%!%$%k%7%9%F%`$N%^%&%s%H$r(B
$B$O$:$7$F$/$@$5$$!#(B

# umount -f -a -t procfs
# umount -f -a -t linprocfs

V.   $B2r7h:v(B - Solution

The kernel was modified to check file descriptors 0, 1, and 2 when
starting a set-user-ID or set-group-ID executable.  If any of these
are not in use, they will be redirected to /dev/null.
kernel $B$O!"(Bset-user-ID $B$d(B set-group-ID $B$5$l$?<B9T%U%!%$%k$r5/F0$9$k;~!"(B
$B%U%!%$%k5-=R;R(B 0$B!"(B1$B!"(B2 $B$r8!::$9$k$h$&$K$J$j$^$7$?!#$3$l$i$N$&$A$N(B
$B$$$:$l$+$,;H$o$l$F$$$J$$>l9g!"(B/dev/null $B$X%j%@%$%l%/%H$5$l$^$9!#(B

1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to 4.6-STABLE; or to any of
the RELENG_4_6 (4.6.1-RELEASE-p1), RELENG_4_5 (4.5-RELEASE-p10), or
RELENG_4_4 (4.4-RELEASE-p17) security branches dated after the
respective correction dates.
1) $B<eE@$r;}$C$?(B FreeBSD $B%7%9%F%`$r:G?7$N(B 4.6-STABLE $B$K%"%C%W%0%l!<%I(B
   $B$9$k$+!"=$@5F|0J9_$N(B RELENG_4_6 (4.6.1-RELEASE-p1)$B!"(BRELENG_4_5
   (4.5-RELEASE-p10)$B!"(BRELENG_4_4 (4.4-RELEASE-p17) $B%;%-%e%j%F%#(B
   $B%V%i%s%A$N$$$:$l$+$K%"%C%W%0%l!<%I$9$k!#(B

2) To patch your present system:
2) $B8=:_$N%7%9%F%`$K%Q%C%A$rE,MQ$9$k!#(B

a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
a) $B0J2<$N>l=j$+$i=$@5%Q%C%A$r%@%&%s%m!<%I$7!"(BPGP $B%f!<%F%#%j%F%#$r;H$C$F(B
   PGP $B=pL>$r3NG'$7$^$9!#(B


[FreeBSD systems earlier than 4.5-RELEASE-p4 and 4.4-RELEASE-p11]
[FreeBSD 4.5-RELEASE-p4 $B$H(B 4.4-RELEASE-p11 $B$h$jA0$N%7%9%F%`(B]

# fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-02:23/stdio.patch.v1.2
# fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-02:23/stdio.patch.v1.2.asc

[FreeBSD versions 4.5-RELEASE-p4 or later, 4.4-RELEASE-p11 or later,
 4.6-RELEASE, and 4.6-STABLE]
[FreeBSD 4.5-RELEASE-p4 $B0J9_!"(B4.4-RELEASE-p11 $B0J9_!"(B4.6-RELEASE$B!"(B
 $B=$@5F|0JA0$N(B 4.6-STABLE $B$N%7%9%F%`(B]

# fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-02:23/stdio2.patch.v1.2
# fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-02:23/stdio2.patch.v1.2.asc

b) Execute the following commands as root:
b) root $B$G0J2<$N%3%^%s%I$r<B9T$7$^$9!#(B

# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch

c) Recompile your kernel as described in
http://www.freebsd.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html and reboot the
system.
c) http://www.freebsd.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html $B$K5-=R$5$l$F$$$k$h$&$K!"(B
   kernel $B$r:F%3%s%Q%$%k$7!"%7%9%F%`$r:F5/F0$7$^$9!#(B

VI.  $B=$@5$N>\:Y(B - Correction details

The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was
corrected in FreeBSD.
FreeBSD $B$N$*$$$F:#2s=$@5$5$l$?3F%U%!%$%k$N%j%S%8%g%sHV9f$r0J2<$K<($7$^$9!#(B

Path                                                             Revision
  Branch
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
sys/sys/filedesc.h
  RELENG_4                                                       1.19.2.4
  RELENG_4_6                                                     1.19.2.4
  RELENG_4_5                                                 1.19.2.3.6.1
  RELENG_4_4                                                 1.19.2.3.4.1
sys/kern/kern_exec.c
  RELENG_4                                                     1.107.2.15
  RELENG_4_6                                               1.107.2.14.2.1
  RELENG_4_5                                               1.107.2.13.2.2
  RELENG_4_4                                                1.107.2.8.2.3
sys/kern/kern_descrip.c
  RELENG_4                                                      1.81.2.12
  RELENG_4_6                                                    1.81.2.14
  RELENG_4_5                                                 1.81.2.9.2.2
  RELENG_4_4                                                 1.81.2.8.2.2
sys/conf/newvers.sh
  RELENG_4_6                                                1.44.2.23.2.6
  RELENG_4_5                                               1.44.2.20.2.11
  RELENG_4_4                                               1.44.2.17.2.16
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------

VII. $B;29M;qNA(B - References

PINE-CERT-20020401 <URL:http://www.pine.nl/advisories/pine-cert-20020401.txt>

A.   FreeBSD $B%;%-%e%j%F%#4+9p(B $BF|K\8lHG$K$D$$$F(B

$BF|K\8lLu$O(B FreeBSD $BF|K\8l%I%-%e%a%s%F!<%7%g%s%W%m%8%'%/%H(B (doc-jp) $B$,(B
$B;29M$N$?$a$KDs6!$9$k$b$N$G$9!#2a5n$NF|K\8lHG%;%-%e%j%F%#4+9p$O(B

 http://www.FreeBSD.org/ja/security/

$B$K$^$H$a$i$l$F$$$^$9!#(B

$B$?$@$7K]Lu<T$*$h$S(B doc-jp $B$O!"$=$NFbMF$K$D$$$F$$$+$J$kJ]>Z$b(B
$B$$$?$7$^$;$s$N$G$4Cm0U$/$@$5$$!#F|K\8lLu$K$D$$$F$N$40U8+!"$4MWK>!"(B
$B$*Ld$$9g$o$;Ey$O(B doc-jp@jp.FreeBSD.org $B$^$G$*4j$$$7$^$9!#(B

$B$3$N4+9p$NCf$G>R2p$5$l$F$$$k(B WWW $B%5%$%H(B http://www.FreeBSD.org/ $B$*$h$S(B
FTP $B%5%$%H(B ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/ $B$K$O(B, $BF|K\$N%_%i!<%5%$%H$,B8:_$7$^$9!#(B
$B%M%C%H%o!<%/$N:.;($r4KOB$9$k$?$a!"$^$:$O%_%i!<%5%$%H$NMxMQ$r(B
$B9MN8$9$k$h$&$*4j$$$7$^$9!#(B

$BF|K\$N%_%i!<%5%$%H$rMxMQ$9$k$K$O!"(B
http://www.FreeBSD.org/ $B$r(B http://www.jp.FreeBSD.org/www.freebsd.org/ $B$K!"(B
ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/ $B$r(B ftp://ftp.jp.FreeBSD.org/ $B$K!"(B
$B$=$l$>$lCV$-49$($F$/$@$5$$!#(B

$BB>$NCO0h$r4^$`%_%i!<%5%$%H$K4X$9$k>\:Y$O(B

 http://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/mirror.html ($B1QJ8(B)
 http://www.FreeBSD.org/ja/handbook/mirror.html ($BF|K\8lLu(B)

$B$K$^$H$a$i$l$F$$$^$9!#(B

----Next_Part(Sat_Aug__3_05:02:55_2002_061)----
